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1 Introduction
Pains vary in intensity. A good philosophical theory of pain should say
something about those variations. For one, variations in the intensity of
pain are, from a practical standpoint, almost as important as the presence
or absence of pain itself. An ibuprofen may dull but not eliminate the pain
of your sore muscles. That will have consequences for how you feel, what
you do, and what your pain is like.
For another, if you don’t say something about degrees of pain, your philo-
sophical opponents will tend to assume that you can’t. We have both recently
defended versions of an imperative theory of pain.1 On such a view, pains
have imperative contents that express commands to do or avoid certain ac-
tions. For example, in Mart´ınez’s version, the content of pain experiences is
analogous to:
See to it that this bodily state does not exist!
Similarly, in Klein’s more recent formulation (forthcoming), a pain is an
imperative along the lines of:
Protect this body part (in this manner)!
1See Klein 2007 and Forthcoming, and Mart´ınez 2010. Richard Hall has also defended
an imperative view in his 2008.
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On both accounts, a pain is an imperative which would be satisfied if the
sufferer of pain ceased to be in a particular bodily state. That bodily state is
often one that is threatening to life or health. On the whole, then, pains com-
mand us to do things that will keep our bodies intact and well-functioning.
Not all pains need do so—the system might misfire in a variety of ways—but
the function of the pain system is to keep us healthy.
Pains work this way because of the nature of imperatives. Imperative con-
tent prescribes some action to be taken, or some goal state to be attained.
Pains are not the only sensation with imperative content. The difference
between pain and many other sensations can be explained in terms of the
differences in the imperatives that constitute them (Hall 2008). Itches com-
mand scratching regions rather than protecting them. Hunger commands
eating rather than an action directed at a particular body part. Finally,
imperative modalities differ from representational modalities like vision and
touch: the latter represent features of the world and have truth-apt contents,
while the former command an action and so do not have truth-apt content.2
In defending imperativism, neither of us has said much about pain inten-
sity. Some have suggested that this is because there is nothing to be said:
imperativism, for principled reasons, cannot give a story about intensity.
That would appear to be a point in favor of representationalism about pain.
After all, many facts about the world vary in magnitude. If pains repre-
sent something, then it is easy to see how that something might vary in
magnitude, and thereby how pains themselves might have different intensi-
ties. The imperativist—who does not think that pains are in the business of
tracking properties in the world—has no corresponding facts to appeal to.
At least, that’s how the objection goes.
Our opponents are too pessimistic. We can give a perfectly satisfying ac-
count of imperative intensity. We’ll present the case in two steps. First,
we must establish the general fact that imperatives can vary in intensity.
We’ll do that in section 2. Along the way, we will respond to several crit-
ics of the imperative theory. Second, we must give a model for variations
in intensity, on which the variations are part of the content of the impera-
tive. Imperativism is most exciting as an intentionalist theory, one on which
2Recently, it has been suggested that the content of certain perceptual states might have
imperatival aspects—see, e.g., Siegel (forthcoming) on experienced mandates, or Bengson
(in progress) on practical perception. Regardless of whether such suggestions are correct,
no one denies that much of the content of perceptual experiences is not imperative.
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phenomenal properties supervene on intentional contents. Gailure to reduce
variations in intensity to variations in content would weaken the appeal. We
give such a model in section 3, and conclude with a few brief reflections on
the naturalization of imperative intensity.
2 Imperatives come in Degrees
2.1 Imperative intensity
Commands come in degrees. All things being equal, shouting:
Pass the salt now!
conveys a more urgent command than does the calm
Please pass the salt at your earliest convenience!
We will call these variations in the intensity of the imperative. Variations
in imperative intensity have practical consequences. All things being equal,
a more intense imperative should be more likely to make you change your
plans, to perform the commanded action sooner, to weight the commanded
action higher when deliberating among mutually exclusive courses of action,
and so on.
More formally, we will assume that the content of an imperative can be
partially identified with a set of satisfaction conditions, here modelled as a
set of possible worlds Wsc.
3 “Pass me the salt!” is satisfied just in case
you pass me the salt. So the content of the imperative is, at a first pass,
the set of worlds in which you pass me the salt. A command from a source
3We assume this without argument; see Hamblin (1987) for some nice ones. We will
refine this quick version, but we will not discuss all of the refinements that might be
necessary. Vranas in particular has given compelling arguments that imperative content
requires both satisfaction and violation conditions, an alternative that we won’t pursue
here (2008).
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that you take to be legitimate gives you a reason to act so as to bring
about the satisfaction conditions. Such commands will thus have practical
consequences for your actions.
We will treat the intensity of a command as a further weighting on the set
of satisfaction worlds. At its most general, then, the proposal is this: the
content of an imperative includes both a set of satisfaction-worlds and a
degree of intensity. Intensity simply functions as a weighting across possible
worlds, dividing them into better and worse, in ways to be elaborated shortly.
Intensities might be relatively vague, as in the case of the salt commands
above. Or the degree may be more precisely specified, as it is in certain
more formal contexts: triage classifications in emergency rooms, the rub-
ber stamps used by enthusiastic managers to prioritize their edicts, or the
priority codes on the Autovon telephone network.
The Autovon priority system is an especially nice example of what we have
in mind. The Autovon network was developed during the Cold War to
provide communication during a nuclear attack. An Autovon keypad had
an additional column of four keys which allowed the user to specify the
precedence level of the call. The dialed number and the precedence level
thus ordered the network to route the call to a certain location, with a
certain precedence. (Note that the priorities relate to the routing of the
calls, not to the contents of the calls themselves. The White House could
use Autovon to order a pizza during a nuclear war. While the call itself would
trump all others, delivery wouldn’t be high on anyone’s list of priorities.)
Higher precedence calls would, if necessary, kick lower precedence calls off
of the trunk to ensure that a call went through. The highest level, which
would guarantee that a call would go through if any could, was restricted to
the White House.4 We will argue that imperative intensity can be generally
modeled by something like the Autovon’s ranking system. Before we get
there, however, we want to say a few words about what imperative intensity
is not.
4A similar, more complex system is still in place. For historical details on the prece-
dence system for Autovon, see page vi of the 1978 “Global Autovon Telephone Directory”,
digitized online at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015078412346.
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2.2 What intensity isn’t
That commands can vary in intensity is, we take it, obvious enough. Further,
the extension to pains seems straightforward enough: pains are imperatives,
like other imperatives they can vary in intensity, and that variation has
exactly the same sorts of practical consequences. A more intense pain in
your foot will, all things being equal, cause you to forgo more activities in
order to tend to your foot, to tend to your foot more urgently, and so forth.
There is still work left to do to ensure that intensity can be usefully modeled.
Before we do it, though, it’s worth distinguishing intensities from a few
things which look a lot like intensity but aren’t. Failure to do so has, we
think, led to some of the objections to the imperative account.
First, the intensity of a command ought to be distinguished from the illo-
cutionary force of an utterance of an imperative. Imperatives can be polite
or nasty; they can be phrased as requests or pleas or straightforward com-
mands. None of these are variations in intensity per se.
Failure to distinguish the two may lead to the impression that variations in
intensity are not part of the content of imperatives. In a recent paper, Cutter
and Tye have objected that an appeal to intensity amounts to abandoning
intentionalism. Regarding the proposal that imperatives vary in intensity,
they write that:
On such a proposal, the difference between [two pains] is analo-
gous to the difference between the following two imperative sen-
tences:
• (Please) stop that bodily disturbance.
• Stop that bodily disturbance!!! (Cutter & Tye 2011)
They then object that such an account is inconsistent with intentionalism
because
[N]ow the phenomenal character of an experience does not su-
pervene on its content alone; rather it supervenes on its content
together with its degree of urgency. (Cutter & Tye 2011, p. 104)
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We agree with Cutter and Tye that the two sentences above may not differ
in content. The variations in the two sentences above are variations in po-
liteness, however, not the intensity of the imperative.5 More generally, two
imperatives may differ in illocutionary force without differing in content.
The very same command may be ordered, demanded, requested, or politely
suggested. Why? Because commands are individuated by their content —
on our account, the satisfaction-conditions of the command plus a weight-
ing over worlds — while differences in illocutionary force depend on the
social circumstances under which imperatives are uttered. So the very same
command, expressed in varying external circumstances, might do different
things without changing in content.
There is the potential for confusion, we suggest, because sometimes facts
about intensity can be expressed by uttering imperatives with the right
illocutionary force — rude commands tend to express high intensity im-
peratives, for example, and polite ones low intensity. But note that that’s
entirely compatible with intensity being part of the content of the command.
Compare: I might express the relative temperature of a 110-degree day by
using a variety of choice expletives. The vigorousness of my swearing might
accurately convey the degree to which some external magnitude varies. Yet
my claims about the temperature still depends, in an important sense, on
what I have said. So too with imperatives.
Given the potential ambiguity, though, we will separate commands (a cer-
tain type of content) from orders (a type of speech act which can convey
a command). Note more generally that commands might need to be dis-
tinguished from related contents like permissives, which permit but do not
obligate action (Hamblin 1987).
Second, intensity ought to be distinguished from the temporal priority or
urgency of the command. Some imperatives ought to be satisfied sooner
than others. This temporal ordering may depend in part upon the intrinsic
content of an imperative. However, priority itself seems like an extrinsic
property of imperatives. That urgent bit of dusting becomes less urgent
when the house is on fire; the urgent ache in your toe suddenly becomes less
so when the bear appears from behind the tree. Of course, priority depends
on intensity: all things being equal, a more intense imperative should also be
5Note that Cutter and Tye use ‘urgency’ rather than intensity. For reasons to become
clear shortly, we want to distinguish the two.
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satisfied sooner. Our account will preserve this feature. But it also depends
on what else is going on, and to which other imperatives you’re subject. So
while imperative priority is tightly related to intensity, it is not the same
thing.6 Hence while urgency is extrinsic, intensity need not be.
Third and finally, imperative intensities are features internal to imperatives.
They need not track any magnitude in the world. That should not be sur-
prising: the imperativist account, remember, says that pains are primarily
spurs to action rather than states which track the world.
Adam Pautz uses this fact to object to the imperative theory. He writes:
While negative imperatives admit of degree, it is hard to see
how their degrees might match up with degrees of painfulness.
What in the imperative contents of [an agent’s] two consecutive
pains. . . might determine that the second pain was roughly twice
greater than the first? (Pautz (2010) p. 364, fn. 36)7
We think that this is to misunderstand the imperativist position. For
all we’ve said, there’s a simple answer to this question: what determines
whether one pain is twice greater than another is simply that it is twice as
intense. That answer will need some refinement, but in general — the fact
that imperatives come in degrees opens the possibility of comparing those
degrees.
Of course, pain intensities differ from the intensities of sensations like light
and sound. The latter track changes in the magnitude of something in
the world. The former don’t. Insofar as judgments about pain intensity
6Contrary to what one of the present authors once defended, in (Klein 2012).
7Pautz actually raises several objections to imperativism that aren’t relevant to the
main point of the paper but are worth mentioning. He notes that that (i) imperativists
have not yet presented a theory of pain locations (true, but a topic for another time;
see chapter seven of Klein, forthcoming), (ii) that imperativism implies that increasing
thermal sensations actually change the type of content they have (true, and here our intu-
itions simply differ on how strange this is—after all, the sensation presumably changes for
a good reason, namely that the cause has become threatening), and (iii) that imperative
theories cannot solve certain problems about magnitude of taste, sound, and color experi-
ences (true, but imperativism doesn’t claim that all sensations are imperative; these are
among those which aren’t, and so require a different treatment.).
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are about anything, they are about pains—and their effects on our motiva-
tional state—rather than about the world.8 But this seems like an attrac-
tive feature of our account, not a problem. The intensity of pain roughly
tracks intensity of (say) injury — but only very roughly. Pain from the very
same injury may ebb or fall in intensity through the day as we rest, take
painkillers, or simply by its own obscure logic. We aren’t inclined to think
that the injury has changed, only that the pain has. More generally, it’s
always an open question whether changes in the intensity of pain correspond
to some change in our injuries. It is not always clear to us whether our pains
correspond to any injury at all. Indeed, there is an extensive empirical lit-
erature, in the form of the gate control theory of pain and its successors,
devoted to elucidating the mechanisms of this dissociation.
So there is no obvious problem here. There is, however, a more subtle prob-
lem lurking in the vicinity. Subjects will consistently judge that two pain
intensities are ratio multiples of each other in laboratory settings (Price et
al 1983). This is often taken as showing that pain intensity itself is a proper
psychophysical magnitude: that is, that it has a theoretically motivated zero
point (Nunnally 1967) and that it makes sense to be realists about subjects’s
judgments because they pick out actual ratios of a real quantity. If so, then
pain intensity is comparable to (say) felt intensity of loudness or brightness.
However, the question of whether pain intensity is really a true magnitude,
and so properly measured by a ratio scale, is a contentious question. The
alternative would be that pain intensities, might be merely orderable, rather
than true magnitudes. That is, it would make sense to talk about pains
being stronger or less strong than one another, but not for one pain to be
twice as bad as another. 9 The mere fact that subjects can respond to ratio
8In that sense, it’s even roughly congruent with Pautz’s larger project, which is an
attack on ‘tracking externalism’ (Pautz, 2014). That includes most representationalist
theories of pain but arguably does not include imperativism. For a discussion of Pautz’s
more general argument, as well as a general response on behalf of the representationalist
which is also partially applicable here, see (Hilbert and Klein, 2014).
9Here is one, admittedly very speculative, argument. A true magnitude requires a zero
point. While it might seem obvious that there is a zero point for pains – that is, their
absence – the idea of a zero point of pain intensity is actually quite odd. Intensity is a
quality that all pains ought to possess. If the intensity scale has a zero point, then it
should be possible to have something which is still a pain, but which has zero intensity.
That’s a really odd possibility, and would need some theoretical motivation. The ordinal
version accounts for our intuitions far more naturally: there are no cases of pains with
zero intensity, but rather of pains that are simply absent. When pains are present, they
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questions and that their response fits a power curve does not itself show
that the scale is a ratio scale. For as Hall notes, this is a task “which pre-
supposes that subjects can judge ratios.” (1981, p. 103). The fact that the
resulting judgments fit a power function (especially across the limited range
available to ethically acceptable laboratory experiments of pain) may thus
show “nothing more than the flexibility of the power function as is evident in
its capacity to fit any of the monotonically increasing curves common-sense
would expect to describe the relationship between numerical judgments and
stimulus intensity.” (p. 104). Ordinal pain intensity would not necessarily
prevent people from making judgments about ratios of pains when instructed
to do so. That might even come out as consistent, especially across limited
ranges of stimuli (such as are ethically inducible in a laboratory). Never-
theless, the ultimate question is not which scale works but which scale is
appropriate for measuring pain.
We think it wise to sidestep this debate. Our goal in the next section, when
we model pain intensities, will be only to give a theory that is consistent
with subject’s judgments of pain intensities, rather than one which assumes
something more controversial about the structure of what underlies those
intensities themselves. That should make the resulting theory compatible
with both magnitude or ordinal theories of pain intensity. It’s worth noting
at the outset, however, that magnitude theories get our proposed structure
on the cheap. Magnitudes can be represented by simple cardinal numbers
on a scale with a true zero. Those should always permit the sort of inter-
comparisons that we will propose. If we were sure that pain intensity were
a magnitude, it would be tempting just to represent it by a simple number
and move on. Since this isn’t obvious, it’s worth building an account that
works even on ordinal theories. Further, even if pain intensity happens to
have a simple structure, imperative intensity more generally probably needs
an ordinal treatment, so the account should be of broader interest.
always have some intensity that’s comparable (i.e. greater than, equal to, or less than)
any other pain. Indeed, the imperativist probably ought to say that intensity might be
vanishingly mild, but it’s never zero–the whole point of imperative sensations is, after all,
to motivate you, and a zero-intensity pain wouldn’t do that.
Of course, a similar argument could be run for many representational sensations, and
there is it more common to assume that they fall on a ratio scale (though this is occasion-
ally debated). Whether this is a reasonable argument, would then depend on whether the
disanalogy between pain and straightforward representational sensations is strong enough
to block the analogy. That is a question for another paper.
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3 Intensity and Content
3.1 Preliminaries
Imperatives vary in intensity; so do pains. A natural conclusion: variations
in intensity of pains are due to variations in the intensity or degree of the
imperatives that constitute them.
That is not quite enough, however. As we’ve emphasized, imperativism is
a species of intentionalism. Intentionalism claims that phenomenal content
supervenes on the content of experiences. We must therefore show that
intensity is part of the content of imperatives.
That is not so obvious. One might hold, for example, that imperative in-
tensity is an extrinsic property (like urgency). We have said this is dis-
tinct, but that’s far from obvious. If it wasn’t, that wouldn’t necessarily
be fatal to imperativism: one could still claim that pains are imperatives
but that their intensity depends on their merely functional (rather than
content-bearing) relations to other mental states. That would be a sort of
quasi-intentionalism, which might in turn still be amenable to a naturalistic
treatment.10 Nevertheless, we take it that one of the attractions of imper-
ativism is its ability to link content and consciousness in what have been
traditionally hard cases for the intentionalist, and so it’s worth trying to
preserve that feature.
The imperativist must also avoid the appearance of an ad hoc solution. So,
for example, one might treat the content of a pain as simply the ordered
pair:
〈Wsc, d〉
where Wsc is the set of worlds in which the imperative is satisfied and d is
the intensity. That would solve the surface problem neatly. But without
saying more, it would be under-motivated. Ideally, the imperativist ought
to get the intensity of pain to fall out of a more general theory of imperatives
and their structure.
In the remainder of this section, we sketch a model of imperatives on which
10Thanks to Todd Ganson (personal communication) for this suggestion.
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intensity falls out as a natural, intrinsic part of content. We will then return
to to pain, using our framework to explain some puzzling features of pains,
and reflecting a bit on the naturalization of intensity.
3.2 Imperatives and Ranking
Remember that we initially identified the content of an imperative with the
set of possible worlds in which the imperative would be satisfied. This can’t
be sufficient, however. The command
(O) Raise money for Oxfam!
admits of two readings: one on which you are commanded to raise any
amount of money, another on which the more money you raise the bet-
ter. Both imperatives would be satisfied in the same worlds: namely, ones
where I raise any amount of money for Oxfam. But the two clearly express
different commands. This is because the second ranks satisfaction-worlds:
the more money I raise, the more preferable the world. Similarly, “Clean
your room!” expresses a different command from “Clean your room, and
the sooner the better!” Both are satisfied in the same worlds. The latter
contains an additional exhortation though, which ought to get you moving
faster.
This suggests that the content of an imperative is larger than just the
satisfaction-worlds: it is instead a set of satisfaction worlds plus a rank-
ing function & defined over the set W of all possible worlds. The ranking
function fills the gap identified above by introducing a mechanism whereby
imperatives satisfied in the same worlds might be compared. For any two
possible worlds wi and wj , wi & wj means that wi is ranked at least as high
as wj . Two worlds are equally ranked if they are ranked at least as high as
each other, and a world wi is ranked strictly better than wj just in case wi
is ranked at least as high as wj and they are not equally ranked.
We can thus model the content of an imperative i as the ordered pair
〈Wsc,&〉
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For most simple imperatives, satisfaction is better than non-satisfaction. So
each world in Wsc is ranked strictly better than each world not in Wsc,
each pair of worlds in Wsc is equally ranked, and mutis mutandis for worlds
not in Wsc. So & partitions W into exactly two equivalence classes: the
satisfaction-worlds and the rest, with worlds in the former preferable to to
the latter. On the first reading of (O), & will simply define a partition
with two equivalence classes: one which includes all and only those worlds
in which the addressee of the imperative raises any amount of money for
Oxfam, another which includes every other possible world, and where any
world in the former equivalence class is strictly preferable to any world in
the latter.
More complex imperatives partition W into more equivalence classes. On
the second reading of (O), & will provide a more complex ranking—the
worlds in Wsc are better than the worlds outside, but the worlds within will
also be further partitioned into smaller equivalence classes, each composed
by all and only those worlds in which the addressee of the imperative raises
a certain amount of money.
This captures the subtle distinction between the two meanings of (O). That
distinction is grounded in the differences in the & of the two readings, not
in the satisfaction-conditions. That suggests that & is part of the content
of imperatives, and necessary to make certain distinctions between them.
Given this expanded content, two observations are the key to a theory of
imperative intensity.
First, note that the & for an imperative i ranks over all possible worlds.
This means that it will also include worlds in which other imperatives are
satisfied.
Second, note that & is not restricted to ranking worlds in Wsc as higher
than worlds not in Wsc. That is, it is possible to have an imperative which
ranks the satisfaction of some other imperative as strictly better than its
own satisfaction. That may seem odd. But note that it is precisely the
case with the formalized structures of imperatives noted in section 2.1. An
Autovon call with status immediate ought to be routed to its destination.
Further, it ought to be routed preferably to calls with status routine. So
worlds where it is routed and a routine call is not are ranked as strictly
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better by & than worlds in which the reverse is the case. And finally, the
call ought to be dropped in case of conflict with a call of status flash. So
there are non-satisfaction worlds (in which the call fails in favor of a flash
call) which are ranked by & as strictly better than satisfaction worlds (i.e.
where the call goes through at the expense of the flash call).
We propose that this sort of structure is actually constitutive of imperative
intensity. Say that an imperative i is satisfied at the expense of some imper-
ative j just in case either i is satisfied and j is not or i is satisfied temporally
prior to j being satisfied. Say that an imperative i is semi-preferable to an
imperative j relative to some (possibly hypothetical) distinct imperative k
just in case either:
1. Both i and j rank all worlds in which i is satisfied at the expense of j
as better than worlds in which j is satisfied at the expense of i
or
2. i and j cannot be satisfied at the expense of one another, but k is such
that
(a) i ranks all worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense of k as
better than worlds in which k is satisfied at the expense of i and
(2) j does not rank all worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense
of k as better than worlds in k is satisfied at the expense of j.
or
(b) i ranks some worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense of k as
not worse than worlds in which k is satisfied at the expense of i
and (2) j ranks all worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense
of k as worse than worlds in k is satisfied at the expense of j.
Given this, we can define imperative intensity as follows:
Intensity An imperative i is more intense than an imperative j just in case
there is some imperative relative to which i is semi-preferable to j and
no imperative relative to which j is semi-preferable to i.
Let’s unpack that a bit. Clause one covers the simple—and by far the
most common—cases where i ranks its own satisfaction as better than j’s,
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and j agrees. How do we know which of two Autovon phone calls is more
important? Well, a Flash call i ranks its own connection as better than
some routine call j, and j also ranks its completion as less important
than the completion of i. So i is semi-preferable to j. As that structure is
consistent across the different Autovon levels, j is never semi-preferable to
i. Hence i is more intense than j.
The third imperative k, and the indirect structure it makes possible, are
necessary for a tricky subset of cases (ones, however, that pains arguably
exemplify). Consider the imperative “Repent of your sins, and the sooner
the better!” It seems possible that the pastor and the prophet might issue
these commands in a way that varies in intensity—the prophet utters it as
a matter of gravest importance, while the pastor is more understanding of
the complexities of modern life. Yet the two imperatives have the same
satisfaction conditions Wsc. Further, they always rank earlier satisfaction
as ceteris paribus better than later satisfaction. So it’s not obvious how to
drive a wedge between the two. Note that this problem appears whenever
we have two imperatives with the same Wsc: it is not possible to construct
worlds in one but not the other is satisfied, or where one is satisfied earlier
than the other, and so it’s hard to see how they might be ranked.
That’s the point of the second clause. For we can still construct semi-
preferability by reference to other things one might do. Consider some
third imperative k – say, to move your car out of the fire lane. The prophet
cares not for fire lanes; iprophet ranks repentance higher than satisfying k.
The pastor understands the importance of rendering unto Caesar and all
that. So ipastor might rank satisfying k as more important than immediate
repentance. (Note that the ranking stipulated by k is irrelevant: it is only the
ranking of various forms of i relative to the satisfaction of k that is at issue.)
This is consistent with the stipulation that the pastor wants you to repent
sooner rather than later, so long as that is read with an appropriate ceteris
paribus clause. For it is true that, everything else being kept fixed, earlier
repentance will be better than later. If so, then iprophet is semi-preferable
to ipastor. Assuming that this structure holds generally, then the prophet’s
imperative is more intense than the pastor’s, even though both are satisfied
in exactly the same conditions. Hence for very similar or identically-satisfied
imperatives, their intensity can still be compared by triangulating against
other possible things you might do.
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3.3 Advantages of our approach
This approach to imperative intensity has several advantages. Most happily,
imperative intensity ends up depending on content. Furthermore, it does so
by depending on content in a principled way: the inclusion of & is neces-
sary to capture the differences between the readings of imperatives like (O).
Second, we have done so using a purely ordinal measure, &, which leaves
open the possibility that the extension to pains might treat pain intensities
as merely ordered.
The theory on offer also explains why imperative intensity makes the most
sense in limited domains—or, conversely, why many imperatives have in-
commensurate urgencies. If I utter (O) and your department chair orders
you to repaint your office, there may not be a well-defined sense in which
one of those commands is more intense than the other. That falls out nicely
from our theory. The two imperatives are mutually selfish: each ranks its
own satisfaction-worlds higher than worlds in which it fails to be satisfied
and the others are. So neither is semi-preferable to the other.
Many simple imperatives might be like this, which partially explains why
imperative intensity has received so little treatment in the literature. It’s
also possible for two imperatives to be incommensurate because each is semi-
preferable to the other with respect to different third imperatives. Such
cases may play a more interesting role in action deliberation when the third
imperative is not merely hypothetical but also one that the agent must try
to satisfy.
Of course, one must decide which imperative ought to take priority in your
actions. Priority, as we established previously, may depend in part on facts
extrinsic to the imperative—your other plans and desires, the source of
the commands, and so on. So priority can be sorted out even in cases
where urgencies are incommensurate. However, when two imperatives are
commensurate, then the more intense one ought to be (all things considered)
satisfied before, and in preference to, the lesser.
Finally, the present theory can account for cases where intensities are judged
on a ratio scale even if they are in fact merely ordered. Suppose & has
relatively fine-grained rankings over worlds, such that (for example) it dis-
tinguishes worlds where you satisfy i and forgo one unit of some good from
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worlds where you satisfy i and forgo two units of some good. Suppose fur-
ther we can identify points of indifference where satisfying i is as good as
some quantity of x, better than any lesser quantity, and worse than any
greater quantity. Given this, suppose we have two imperatives i and j each
of which have this structure relative to the xs, and further that i ranks
its satisfaction as on a par with n units of x while j ranks itself as on a
par with 2n such units. Under such circumstances, we can say that j is
not just more intense but twice as intense as i.11 One would, of course,
need such a structure to be in place consistently—but if it were, it would
be natural to speak of ratios of urgencies, not simply ordinal comparisons
between them. Note here that the relevant ratio measure has no relation
whatsoever to properties, but only to the rankings of different satisfaction
and non-satisfaction worlds by the imperative. Hence we can have complex
differences in the intensity of an imperative without having to find a sense
in which that imperative somehow tracks a magnitude in the world.
3.4 The Intensity of Pain
The extension to pain is straightforward. Pains are imperatives. As part of
their content, they have an especially rich and complex &, one rich enough
to make the sorts of comparisons noted above. So, for example, one pain is
more intense than another just in case their world-rankings agree that one
should tend to the body part involved in the first pain at the expense of the
one in the second. Differences in intensity of pains in the same body part
can be cashed out (for example) in terms of standard gambles against other
valued goods.
This structure explains differences in intensities of pain. It also allows plenty
of flexibility to account for oddities of cross-modal judgments of intensity.
I can judge the intensity of my pain and my hunger; further, I can judge
that my hunger is more intense than my pain. It is not clear to us, however,
11Or more precisely, under conditions where both rankings satisfy the axioms of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern theorem. If so, then the theorem would ensure that we could find
a suitable cardinal function that described an agent’s behavior, and that would in turn be
enough to account for ratio judgments of intensity as well as standard bets over merely
likely satisfactions of i. If you don’t like the arbitrary good x, you might also construct a
cardinal function out of those standard bets. Note that this is consistent with, but does
not imply, the presence of an actual real-valued magnitude which gives rise to & (Ellsberg
1954).
16
whether we’re ever in a position to judge that some hunger is twice as intense
as a pain. If that is a puzzling thing to say, the phenomenon can be captured
by our account: it will occur if & has the requisite structure to make ratio
judgments only within modalities, while between-modality imperatives have
enough structure to & to allow ordinal but not ratio judgments. This would
be the case if, for example, a set of imperatives had a structure like the
following (where ∼ indicates ‘is ranked equally with’).
&1 I don’t have pain1 ∼ [I have pain1 and $2] > I don’t have pain2 ∼ [I
have pain2 and $1] > I don’t have hunger1 > I don’t have hunger2
&2 I don’t have pain1 > I don’t have pain2 > I don’t have hunger1 ∼ [I have
hunger1 and $2 > I don’t have hunger2 ∼ [I have hunger2 and $1]
That is, both rankings place pain only as more intense than hunger, but each
of them has richer structure within just one modality. Hence cross-modality
comparisons are merely ordinal, but intra-modality ones can be cardinal.
Further elaborations of the model could account for other pain phenomena.
Here is one intriguing possibility. Merely ordinal rankings—even ones that
can be used to derive cardinal ranking functions—are not easily aggregated.
Even if, say, the pain in my feet is more intense than both my hunger and
my thirst, it’s not obvious whether I should stop hiking or continue on given
that I am both hungry and thirsty.
Models of aggregation do exist, however. In those models, different ordinal
rankings receive weightings which determine how much they matter to the
final aggregate.12 In the context of pain, those weights might be interpreted
as marking individual differences in the importance of pain: individuals who
tend to assign low weights to pains in aggregation will, all things considered,
discount even relatively intense pains. Hence we might also have a model
for individual differences in imperative intensity, one which would further
distinguish between different imperative modalities.
12So, for example, one might use the weighted Kendall-tau distance. The Kendall-tau
distance is a measure of how often reversals occur between pairs of ordinal rankings. Ag-
gregated rankings which minimize the weighted Kendall-tau distance have a number of in-
tuitively appealing properties. See Ailon, Charikar, and Newman 2008 for a discussion and
review of other ranking methods, and Mart´ınez (forthcoming) for a ranking-aggregation
model of pain.
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Finally—since it can’t be emphasized enough—these differences in the inten-
sity of pain depend entirely on the contents of the imperatives that constitute
pain. Hence imperativism remains consistent with intentionalism.
3.5 The Naturalization of Intensity
A few final thoughts on the naturalization of imperative intensity will serve
as a conclusion. One might worry that the contents so proposed are un-
usually florid, particularly the complexities of the ranking function. Note,
however, that this is no argument against a model of content itself. One
should no more balk at the complexity of the ranking function than at the
use of sets of possible worlds. We have not committed ourselves to a story
about how the content of imperatives is implemented, but we see no reason
why that story faces any principled problems—why the above, for example,
could not be cashed out in an approximate sense at least by patterns and
frequencies of neural firings.
That said, imperativism is attractive in part because it promises a full natu-
ralization of pain. We conclude, therefore, with two brief reflections on how
thinking of pains as imperatives might be especially useful. First, one might
look to work on imperatives in natural language, particularly on how the
contents of imperatives gets fixed in conversational contexts. In this regard
we have found particularly illuminating Paul Portner’s work on imperatives.
According to Portner, when someone utters an imperative in a conversation,
it adds an item to the To-do list of the addressee. So, for example, telling
me to pass the salt has the effect of appending the property of being such
that I pass the salt to my To-do list (2007). The To-do list functions as an
action-oriented version of Stalnaker’s Common Ground (Stalnaker 2002). It
can be affected by other imperatives, as well as by background desires and
goals of the participants. A similar model, we believe, might prove fruitful
when exploring the effect of pains on the overall mental economy.
Second, imperativism fits naturally with a teleosemantic account of mental
content (Millikan 1984; Mart´ınez 2010). The main contention of this kind
of approach is that the content of mental states depends on their biological
function, or that of appropriately related states. Cashing out that biological
function requires a story about the consumers of imperative contents. Here
again, the imperative view has much to say. Some regions in the motor
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cortex, for example, are likely consumers for painful mental states. Inten-
sities here play an important role. A mental mechanism can advocate for
the spending of more or less resources in certain behaviors. Take, for exam-
ple, physiological responses (increasing heart rate, avoidance) in the face of
danger: dangers that are assessed as less pressing provoke a lesser response
that more urgent ones. A well-adapted biological agent thus needs both
information about what to do and about how important it is to do. Our
account of imperative content provides a nice framework within which to
cash out that idea.
4 Conclusion
The semantics of imperatives which differ in intensity is not a topic that
has received as much attention as others in the study of imperatives. Our
discussion of imperative intensity, and the formal apparatus we have used to
frame it, is proposed in the spirit of a preliminary exploration. In that spirit,
we’ve shown that imperativism has no insurmountable problems dealing
with varying degrees of intensity.
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